Thomas Beaton Sr. v. Franklin Tennis by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-31-2012 
Thomas Beaton Sr. v. Franklin Tennis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Thomas Beaton Sr. v. Franklin Tennis" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1505. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1505 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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_____________ 
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District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
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(Opinion Filed: January 31, 2012)                         
_____________ 
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OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiff Thomas Beaton appeals a District Court order granting a motion by 
defendants, employees of the Department of Corrections who worked at a prison where 
Beaton was incarcerated, for summary judgment on Beaton‟s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 failure-to-
protect claim.  Although we disagree with the District Court‟s conclusion that Beaton 
failed to administratively exhaust his claim, we conclude that Beaton‟s claim fails on the 
merits and, accordingly, will affirm. 
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I. 
On August 28, 2006, “Sharif,” a fellow inmate at SCI-Rockview prison, attacked 
Beaton with a padlock.  The padlock struck Beaton in the mouth, causing him to fall and 
hit his head on the concrete floor.  Beaton suffered injuries to his lip, teeth, and head.  In 
the following months, he was diagnosed with a fracture in his right occipital lobe and 
post-concussion syndrome, which caused headaches, vertigo, nausea, visual distortion, 
and affected his ability to concentrate.  Beaton alleged that the defendants failed to 
protect him from such an attack because they knew or should have known of a risk to 
Beaton of an attack by Sharif or, more generally, of the risk to all inmates of injury 
resulting from attacks using padlocks, which the prison makes available to prisoners 
through its commissary.   
Beaton filed a grievance complaining about the attack on October 1, 2006.  The 
grievance initially was returned to him as untimely, but Beaton appealed to the prison 
superintendant, defendant Tennis, asking for permission to proceed and stating that the 
grievance was untimely filed as a result of Beaton‟s injuries from the assault.  Tennis told 
Beaton that the matter would be investigated, and directed him to refile the original 
grievance.  Defendant Patishnock, the Unit Manager of Beaton‟s housing unit at the time, 
reviewed the grievance and filled out a form that stated that it had been accepted for 
review.  On October 16, 2006, however, Beaton met with Patishnock and signed and 
dated the “withdrawal” section of his grievance form.  Beaton testified in his deposition 
that he believed that he was withdrawing a different grievance, related to a request for 
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transfer to a different cell block, and that Patishnock deliberately confused him by 
placing the withdrawal form underneath paperwork related to the housing grievance.  
On October 31, 2006, Beaton wrote a letter to Tennis seeking to appeal the 
withdrawal and refile his grievance, asserting that Patishnock had taken advantage of 
confusion arising from Beaton‟s injuries.  Tennis denied the request.  Beaton appealed 
that denial to the Office of Grievances and Appeals, which initially requested additional 
paperwork, but, after clarification, denied Beaton‟s appeal, citing prison regulations that 
forbid appeals after a grievance has been withdrawn. 
Beaton filed this suit, and, after discovery, defendants moved for summary 
judgment.  A magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation urging that 
defendants‟ motion be granted on administrative exhaustion grounds and on the merits of 
Beaton‟s claims.  The report concluded that there were no factual issues regarding 
Beaton‟s failure to exhaust, based on Patishnock‟s testimony and Beaton‟s withdrawal of 
the grievance.  The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge‟s report, granted 
defendants‟ motion, and directed the clerk to enter judgment for defendants. 
II. 
A. 
On these facts, the Magistrate Judge and District Court erred in concluding that 
Beaton failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.  This is not a typical administrative 
exhaustion case, in which a plaintiff ignores the required procedures or otherwise 
neglects his claim.  Instead, Beaton filed the proper grievance, appealed when necessary 
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(securing a promise to investigate despite an initial finding that the grievance was not 
timely filed), and followed up once he realized that the grievance had been withdrawn.   
More importantly, inmates “need only exhaust such administrative remedies as 
„are available,‟” Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(a)), and, as the Magistrate Judge observed, “[a]ffirmative misconduct by prison 
officials designed to impede or prevent an inmate‟s attempts to exhaust may render 
administrative remedies unavailable,” Beaton v. Tennis, No. 07-1526, 2010 WL 2696857, 
at *4 (M.D. Pa. May 10, 2010).  Beaton alleged misconduct of this sort, namely that 
defendant Patishnock intentionally tricked him into withdrawing his grievance. 
The record contains sufficient evidence to support Beaton‟s allegations at the 
summary judgment stage.  Specifically, Beaton testified both that Patishnock arranged 
the paperwork so that Beaton would believe that he was withdrawing the housing 
grievance, not the assault grievance, and that Patishnock specifically asked him to 
withdraw the housing grievance.  Beaton adds that, as a result of the assault, his mental 
state was unstable and he was easily confused.  Beaton‟s subsequent letters to Tennis and 
the Office of Grievances and Appeals also document Beaton‟s version of events.  The 
Magistrate Judge and District Court relied solely on Patishnock‟s statements that Beaton 
said that he wanted to withdraw the assault grievance to reject Beaton‟s claim.  But, in 
light of the documents and Beaton‟s contrary testimony, the most that can be said about 
Patishnock‟s statements is that they create a material fact question for the jury to resolve.  
The District Court therefore should not have granted summary judgment to defendants on 
this ground. 
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B. 
The District Court did not base its decision solely on the administrative-exhaustion 
question; it also determined that “Beaton fail[ed] to state a cognizable failure to protect 
claim.”  Beaton v. Tennis, No. 07-1526, 2010 WL 2696853, at *1 (M.D. Pa. July 7, 
2010).  We agree. 
The Magistrate Judge rejected Beaton‟s claim that defendants failed to protect him 
from Sharif because it found that Sharif‟s alleged threats to Beaton — a comment that 
Beaton‟s “shower‟s up” and a subsequent comment, made a month-and-a-half before the 
assault, that Sharif was “going to f*** [Beaton] up” — did not establish a risk of 
pervasive harm.  He also concluded that the threats were too remote in time to suggest a 
“real and proximate threat” to Beaton and, in the prison context, were too vague to be 
actionable.  Beaton, 2010 WL 2696857, at *5.  Nothing in Beaton‟s submissions to this 
Court convinces us otherwise.   
Beaton‟s claim concerning the danger of padlocks in the prison also fails.  As the 
Magistrate Judge found, Beaton has not raised a genuine issue of fact that the prison‟s 
padlock policy creates a substantial or pervasive risk of harm to its inmates.  Tennis 
acknowledged previous padlock assaults in the prison, and testified that they typically 
occur at a rate of 1 or 2 per year.  Given the padlocks‟ legitimate uses — to secure 
prisoners‟ belongings — and the fact that inmates may use even the most harmless 
objects as weapons (Tennis testified that attacks using bars of soap are much more 
common than those using padlocks), the Magistrate Judge concluded that the evidence 
did not support a conclusion that a failure to remove padlocks from the prison constituted 
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deliberate indifference by the defendants.  Id. at *6.  We find no error in his analysis or 
conclusion.
1
 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                                 
1
  We also reject Beaton‟s argument that the Magistrate Judge abused his discretion by 
denying Beaton‟s motion for leave to file an untimely counterstatement of facts in 
support of his summary judgment opposition.  Beaton‟s counsel plainly did not follow the 
local rules, and offered a series of evolving, even inconsistent, excuses for his failure to 
do so.  Under those circumstances, the Magistrate Judge had no obligation to consider 
Beaton‟s late filing. 
